India’s dilemmas in dealing with China are increasing. We have to both resist and engage China. Resist, because China continues to lay claims to Indian territory provocatively. To assert its historical claim to Arunachal Pradesh, for example, China is periodically giving Chinese names to sites and locations there, unbothered by India’s sensitivities. It continues to protest whenever an Indian leader visits Arunachal Pradesh. This has not deterred our leaders from making such visits and announcing development projects in the state.
China has now officially announced the construction of the gargantuan dam project on the bend of the Brahmaputra before it enters India. This project has been initiated without any regard for the rights of the lower riparian states, not to mention the potential damage to the fragile ecosystem of Tibet, from where many of the great rivers of Asia originate, and the concomitant impact on international climate change concerns.
India has not protested to China about undertaking a project without keeping it informed about its dimensions so that its impact downstream could be properly assessed. The international environmentalist lobby has not raised concerns either, which we should encourage them to do.
In Ladakh, some progress in reaching understandings on respective patrolling rights in contested areas has been made after a score of rounds of military and diplomatic talks. But patrolling has not been resumed in the so-called buffer zones, as was the understanding. De-escalation has not been achieved, much less a return to the status quo ante on the ground before the eruption of the clash in Galwan in 2020. India is reconciled to this reality and is organising its force structure accordingly.
China is expanding and strengthening its military presence in Tibet. In return, India continues to rapidly improve its military infrastructure in the Himalayas so that we can respond more quickly to any Chinese effort to change the status quo on the ground. That a large number of Indian forces continue to be deployed at great Himalayan heights since 2020 sends a powerful deterrent message to China that its ‘salami-slicing tactics’ will be resisted.
Our concerns about China’s relations with Pakistan have become sharper after Operation Sindoor because of the active ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) support China provided, as publicly divulged by a senior Indian military officer. Indian planners have always had concerns about being faced potentially with a two-front situation, given the very close strategic ties between China and Pakistan. This requires us to strengthen our defence capabilities, both in terms of indigenisation of defence manufacturing as well as reforms in higher defence management and new military doctrines that take into account the latest developments in warfare that have surfaced during the Ukraine conflict, in particular.
Most of Pakistan’s military equipment is of Chinese origin. Beijing is promoting the Pakistani propaganda about the downing of our aircraft, especially the Rafale aircraft, by a Chinese-supplied air-to-air missile fired from its combat aircraft in Pakistan’s inventory. This is both commercial and psychological warfare. India has to keep a close watch on Chinese military supplies to Pakistan.
China continues to be active in our region. With the developments in Bangladesh and the overtures the Islamists there are making to Pakistan, China is encouraging this by politically chaperoning a resumption of Bangladesh–Pakistan ties. In the Maldives and Sri Lanka, India has recovered from the setbacks it received at the hands of the Chinese. We need to continue working in Nepal to protect our interests.
India also has to continue engaging China because it is now the biggest manufacturing power, the biggest exporter, and the second-largest economy. It has made impressive strides in advanced technology. It dominates the production of rare earths, lithium batteries for electric vehicles, and solar panels. China cannot be bypassed in these sectors as well as others such as APIs for the pharmaceutical industry, including India’s.
India is dependent on many intermediate goods for its own export products, which explains why India–China trade is expanding. It is now at over $130 billion, with the deficit close to $100 billion. Reducing our import dependence on China will be a slow process, but it must happen if we are to have more space to resist China. Despite our repeatedly raising the issue of our unsustainable deficits with it, China has been unresponsive.
China, in some ways, is hardening its posture on the economic side by delaying the supply of specific equipment to India and quietly imposing some technology restrictions. China will resist the shifting of international supply chains to India as much as it can, as it sees India as a threatening rival.
At the same time, lobbies in India are arguing in favour of easing restrictions on Chinese investments in India and, generally speaking, leveraging China’s progress in technology and innovation to accelerate our own growth. This suits China’s strategy of de-linking the border issue from opening up the Indian market more to Chinese goods.
External Affairs Minister Jaishankar has met his counterpart Wang Yi several times, with no substantive breakthrough so far. Both sides repeat their standard positions after each meeting. Our emphasis is on mutual sensitivity, mutual respect and mutual benefit, and the repeated message that relations cannot be normal if the border situation is not normal. The Chinese use standard phrases that are platitudinous and give no real clue to their thinking.
India is a vocal supporter of Quad and the Indo-Pacific concept, seeing both as building deterrence against China, although this is not specifically stated. India wants to broaden cooperation within Quad to serve the additional purpose of harnessing the economic and technological strength of its partners for its own economic growth. The Malabar exercises give naval muscle to the cooperation between the US, Japan, Australia and India.
The US recognises the role of India in containing China’s expansionist tendencies, especially in the Indian Ocean. It is making equipment and technologies available to India to counter China’s maritime threat. The US has, of course, no plans to get involved actively in India’s border issue with China, though it would be ready to make available intelligence and some equipment to bolster our defensive capabilities.
While the US treats China as its principal adversary and seeks to build alliances and partnerships to curb its ambitions, it also seeks to engage with China, which is its biggest trade partner, and US corporations have invested there massively. The US does not want a military conflict with China.
With US President Donald Trump, the uncertainties have increased about how much the US wants to reach a modus vivendi with China without a conflict and what could be the nature of the deal. India, therefore, has to be cautious in aligning itself completely with the US on China, knowing that the US would singularly pursue its national interest. India has to, therefore, delicately balance its ties with the US while keeping some doors open to China through bilateral trade, the BRICS and the SCO.
With Trump now targeting India on the trade front, imposing 25% tariffs on its exports to the US, threatening more tariffs because of India’s oil and defence ties with Russia, while also courting Pakistan to put pressure on India, the India–US ties are getting frayed.
This weakens India vis-à-vis China in the power game. China has always expressed concern about strengthening India–US ties, seeing them as being directed at China. With those ties under stress, China may calculate that it has a freer hand to keep India under pressure. Its attitude could well harden, if not immediately, as it would want to see how things develop, but in due course.
India’s policy of both resisting and engaging China will be put to the test in the coming period.
(The author is a former foreign secretary. He was ambassador of India to Turkey, Egypt, France and Russia, and deputy chief of mission in Washington, D.C. He is currently chancellor of JNU)
