With nearly nine million Indians across the region, strategic ambiguity is not a luxury India can afford
Every time tensions rise in the Middle East, India’s domestic response follows a familiar and troubling pattern. Television studios produce dramatic forecasts of regional conflagration. Social media amplifies unverified claims. Families across India begin calling relatives in Gulf cities, asking whether they should pack up and return home.
Ironically, the very governments at the centre of these tensions, Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, Doha and Muscat, are typically the calmest voices in the room. Their official communications are measured, factual and reassuring. Their message to residents and investors is consistent: “We are stable. We are managing this. Carry on.” That contrast should give India pause.
The Middle East Is India’s Economic Anchor
For India, the Gulf is not a distant theatre of geopolitics. It is an extension of India’s own economic and human landscape, and arguably the single most strategically important region for Indian interests outside South Asia.
Close to nine million Indians live and work across the Gulf states, the largest concentration of the Indian diaspora anywhere in the world. The UAE alone hosts approximately 3.5 million Indian nationals; Saudi Arabia, another 2.5 million. Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain together account for nearly three million more. Their remittances, estimated at $45–50 billion annually by the Reserve Bank of India, make the Gulf the single largest source of inward remittances for a country that, in 2023, received $125 billion in total, the highest of any nation globally.
The region is equally central to India’s energy security. Roughly 65 per cent of India’s crude oil imports originate in the Middle East, with Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait among the top four suppliers. Qatar supplies close to 45 per cent of India’s liquefied natural gas imports, making it an indispensable energy partner.
Trade ties have deepened rapidly. The India–UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, signed in February 2022 and in force since May that year, has pushed bilateral trade past $85 billion annually, with a stated ambition of reaching $100 billion by 2030. Economic engagement with Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman continues to expand across infrastructure, renewables and financial services.
What happens in the Gulf, therefore, has immediate and measurable consequences for Indian households, businesses and the state. And yet, during moments of regional turbulence, India’s public posture has repeatedly appeared hesitant and inadequately communicated.
A Lesson in Crisis Communication
There is an instructive irony in how Gulf governments handle regional crises. Countries often characterised in the Western press as politically volatile have, in practice, developed some of the most effective public communication frameworks in the world.
Across the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, official messaging during periods of elevated tension is calm, factual and forward-looking. Authorities issue timely updates, emphasise institutional continuity and avoid inflammatory rhetoric that could trigger capital flight or public panic. The objective is straightforward: maintain confidence among residents, investors and international partners so that economic activity continues without disruption.
This maturity in public communication is one reason these societies continue to function with remarkable stability even during episodes of genuine geopolitical stress. It is a model worth studying and, where relevant, emulating.
India’s diplomatic posture in the region has improved considerably over the past decade. New Delhi has cultivated strong bilateral relationships with Gulf states, secured privileged access to energy supply chains and positioned itself as a credible partner in regional infrastructure development. The problem is not the quality of these relationships. The problem is what happens to India’s public voice when those relationships come under pressure.
Narrative Problem Begins at Home
Much of the confusion generated during Middle East crises does not originate in the region. It originates in India, specifically in segments of the Indian media that have increasingly turned complex geopolitical developments into domestic spectacle.
What should be informed strategic analysis often becomes theatrical nationalism. Events are framed not for what they mean for Indian interests in the region, but for what rhetorical use they can serve at home. The result is reporting that may resonate with domestic audiences but carries tangible consequences abroad.
The approximately nine million Indians living across the Gulf watch these broadcasts. Their employers watch them. Their host governments watch them. When exaggerated or inaccurate narratives gain wide circulation, they generate unnecessary anxiety, prompt businesses to reassess risk, and undermine India’s credibility in countries that host the world’s largest Indian diaspora.
There is a meaningful distinction between competitive domestic media commentary and irresponsible international crisis reporting. The former is a feature of democracy. The latter is a liability for foreign policy.
What India Must Do Differently
India does not need to insert itself into regional rivalries. But it does need a clearer, more proactive framework for protecting its people and projecting its interests when the region enters periods of turbulence.
Indian diplomatic missions across the Gulf should establish structured engagement with Indian communities during periods of elevated tension — not emergency helplines activated after panic sets in, but regular, pre-existing channels through which accurate information can flow rapidly. Ambassadors should maintain sustained relationships with Indian professional associations, business councils, labour welfare organisations and community groups, not merely during crises, but consistently, so that trust is already in place when it is needed.
The Ministry of External Affairs should strengthen its real-time communication architecture, ensuring that embassies, major Indian employers in the region, airlines and community organisations operate from a shared factual baseline when tensions rise. The goal is not spin management. It is the orderly, efficient dissemination of accurate information to nearly nine million people who deserve to hear from their government before they hear from a television anchor.
Finally, the government must be willing to publicly challenge irresponsible domestic narratives around international crises. If ministers have the appetite to call out media inaccuracies on domestic issues, they should apply the same standard to reporting that distorts events abroad and fuels avoidable anxiety among Indian citizens overseas.
A Confident Stakeholder, Not a Hesitant Observer
India today is not a peripheral player in the Middle East. It is a major economic partner to Gulf states, the largest single source of expatriate labour in the region, a top-five consumer of Gulf energy and an increasingly significant investor in the region’s diversification agenda.
That position demands a foreign policy posture that is confident, communicative and consistent, not one that oscillates between theatrical alarm and bureaucratic silence in response to the domestic news cycle.
The Middle East is not a region from which Indians must prepare to evacuate. It is a region where nearly nine million Indians have built lives, careers and communities. The obligation of the Indian state is not to manage the optics of a crisis. It is to ensure that its citizens are informed, reassured and protected.
Clarity, in this context, is not simply a diplomatic virtue. It is a responsibility of governance.
(Rakesh K. Chitkara is a public policy advisor and strategic affairs commentator based in Dubai. He writes on geopolitics, global trade, energy security and India, USA and Middle East economic relations. He is currently representing the World Agriculture Forum, Netherlands, in the UAE)
