By Abir Dasgupta and Paranjoy Guha Thakurta
Three separate agencies of the United States government have decided to drop charges of bribery, corruption, fraud and violation of sanctions against entities in the Adani Group. In what many see as a quid pro quo — rightly or wrongly — Adani has promised to invest $10 billion (₹96,000 crore) in America and create 15,000 jobs, adding an unusual twist to India-US relations. America has settled. India has not even begun to ask questions — and that, more than anything else, is the real scandal.
Rs 36,000 CR BAIL OUT
On May 14, 2026, law enforcement agencies in the United States of America said that Gautam Adani, one of India’s richest men and also among the world’s richest men, would cough up $6 million (₹57.6 crore at prevailing exchange rates) while his nephew Sagar Adani would pay $12 million (₹115.2 crore) to settle criminal and civil charges of fraud, bribery and allegations of misleading US investors in courts of law. The defendants, the two Adanis, reportedly agreed to a “plea bargain” without admitting or denying the allegations levelled by the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the regulator of that country’s financial markets. The allegations are based on investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which works under the DOJ.
In addition, the Adani Group would also pay $275 million (₹1,680 crore) to settle with the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, a separate investigation involving the shipping of Iranian gas that was sanctioned by the American government.
The following day, opposition parties, including the Indian National Congress, questioned whether Prime Minister Narendra Modi would enter into a trade deal between India and the US government under pressure from “Modi’s close friend” Adani. In a post on X (formerly Twitter), the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha, Rahul Gandhi, said: “The compromised PM has not struck a trade deal, but a bargain for Adani’s release.”
Gandhi’s statement came after the New York Times (NYT) wrote that Adani’s legal team, led by lawyer Robert Giuffra Junior, who is also the personal attorney of US President Donald Trump, indicated that the billionaire businessman from India would be willing to invest $10 billion (₹96,070 crore) in the US and create around 15,000 jobs in America if, to use the words of the NYT, the “prosecutors dropped the charges”. In November 2024, soon after it became known that Trump would have a second term as president of the US, Adani publicly committed to investing in the energy sector in the country.
- BRIBES, BILLIONS & ADANI
When most Indians were fast asleep on November 21, 2024, news broke in New York and Washington DC that the DOJ had served a document akin to a chargesheet that sought to indict the then 62-year-old business magnate Gautam Adani, his nephew Sagar Adani, their associate Vneet Jaain (all directors in various entities in the sprawling, widely diversified Adani conglomerate) besides four others associated with a Canada-based pension fund. Soon afterwards, it was announced that the SEC, too, had filed civil and criminal complaints against them, that a grand jury subpoena (or a summons to appear before a jury in a court in Brooklyn, New York) had been issued, and that a warrant of arrest was being prepared against them. These developments took place towards the fag end of the Joe Biden regime. Adani Group spokespersons later denied the allegations levelled by the DOJ and the SEC.
India’s stock markets became jittery. Adani Group company shares came down by proportions varying between 7.2 per cent and 22 per cent on the National Stock Exchange (NSE) by the end of trading that day, that is, November 21, 2024. This was the first time Adani Group stocks had taken such a beating after January 2023, when a 30,000-word report by the New York-based firm Hindenburg Research was published, claiming that Adani was “pulling the largest con in corporate history”. These claims, too, were denied. The short-selling firm led by Nathan Anderson eventually wound up its operations but not before releasing another exposé alleging that the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), then under chairperson Madhabi Puri Buch, had turned a blind eye to claims that Adani Group entities were flouting stock market rules.
A perusal of the DOJ’s 54-page indictment order and the SEC’s allegations would make it apparent that the FBI had conducted its investigations minutely before making them public. More than a year and a half before it came to light, on March 17, 2023, FBI special agents had confronted Sagar Adani with a court-authorised search warrant, seizing his personal electronic devices, including his mobile phone and laptop.
The FBI agents claimed that these devices contained a list of persons and organisations who had been, or had to be, allegedly bribed to clinch power purchase and sale agreements for supplying solar energy from Adani-owned projects. The agreements related to projects in four states and one Union Territory (UT) in India: Tamil Nadu, Odisha, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, and Jammu & Kashmir. It was disclosed that Gautam Adani himself had taken photographs of the search warrant and subpoena documents served on his nephew and emailed these to himself.
What were the allegations? It was claimed that Adani Green Energy and Azure Power had obtained contracts through a bidding process to generate solar energy from a public sector company, the Solar Energy Corporation of India (or SECI, not to be confused with the SEC of the US), which is under the administrative control of the Union Ministry of New and Renewable Energy in the Government of India. The per-unit price of solar energy was deemed too high, leaving SECI struggling to find takers among state-owned electricity distribution companies (discoms). The DOJ alleged that Adani Group companies paid bribes to ensure that electricity generated was actually sold at the high rates cited.
The total quantum of bribes that were allegedly paid or promised to be paid to “officials” in India was $265 million or around ₹2,029 crore at the then prevailing exchange rates. The lion’s share of this amount ($228 million or ₹1,746 crore) allegedly went to officials in one state, Andhra Pradesh, then headed by Y S Jaganmohan (Jagan) Reddy, whose name figures in the fine print of the SEC’s documents. Despite the YSR Congress Party (YSRCP) and its leader Jagan Reddy denying any wrongdoing, records show that Gautam Adani met privately with Jagan Reddy in August 2021, weeks before the Andhra Pradesh state government signed a controversial power purchase agreement with the Adani Group. Sagar Adani also met the then chief minister the following month.
What has also been alleged is something unprecedented: the amounts that were paid or promised as bribes were calculated on the basis of each megawatt (MW) of electricity purchased. The rate was ₹25 lakh per MW at the exchange rates prevalent in August 2021.
Why were these four states and one Union Territory selected? The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was not in power in any of the four states, while its nominee was heading the government of the UT of Jammu & Kashmir. Should it be presumed that officials in BJP-ruled states did not have to be bribed to enter into agreements with the Adani Group for supplying solar power to their discoms?
A former secretary, economic affairs, in the Union Ministry of Finance, who is now an activist, Dr E A S Sarma, has said that the Union government should order a judicial investigation into the allegations of bribery and multiple undue favours to the Adani Group. He said that such a probe should take place irrespective of the outcome of the proceedings in the US, since there are allegations of offering bribes to Indian politicians and officials. Dr Sarma raised this demand in an open letter to Cabinet Secretary T V Somanathan.
The important question is why the Modi government has not so far asked its law-enforcement agencies, including the Central Bureau of Investigation, the Enforcement Directorate and the Income Tax Department, to investigate former Chief Ministers like Jagan Reddy (who is no longer aligned with the BJP), Bhupesh Baghel of the Congress, Naveen Patnaik of the Biju Janata Dal (who is also estranged from the BJP) and M K Stalin of the Dravida Munnettra Kazhagam (DMK). After all, these agencies are known to have, in the past, targeted several opposition leaders. The reason for the central government’s inaction is simple: the Adani Group is involved, and its head is a close friend of Prime Minister Modi. It would, of course, be too much to expect the Lieutenant Governor of J&K, Manoj Sinha of the BJP, to be probed.
An interesting sidelight to the story relates to N Chandrababu Naidu, chief minister of Andhra Pradesh, who, when he was leader of the opposition in the state, had sharply criticised Jagan Reddy’s government for allegedly “favouring” Adani. Naidu’s supporters even filed a public interest litigation (PIL) in this regard in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. One of Naidu’s confidants, Finance Minister of Andhra Pradesh Payyavula Keshav, first said that the state government’s agreement with Adani could be scrapped but then quickly backtracked, saying “legal” options would be looked into. Why the flip-flop has taken place is clear: Naidu is the leader of the Telugu Desam Party (TDP), a regional political outfit of Andhra Pradesh, which is an important coalition partner of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government in New Delhi.
- LIED TO AMERICA, LIED TO INDIA
What exactly were the charges against Adani and his associates that were filed in the US? Adani Group companies, including Adani Green Energy, raised funds through several financial instruments, such as “green bonds” and “senior secured notes”. These instruments were subscribed to by investors from various countries, including the US. In August-September 2021, the group raised $750 million, of which $175 million was reserved for Americans. Another issue of bonds worth $409 million by entities in the Adani Group took place in March 2024.
The law in the US, in particular the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977, states that if a bribe, or an offer to bribe, is paid, or made, in any country, it would be considered a cognisable offence under American law if any citizen or entity of the US is impacted or affected. Trump has said many times that he is opposed to the “horrible” FCPA because it works against American business interests. Still, the law remains on America’s statute books.
The SEC’s central allegation against Adani is that the business tycoon concealed a critical fact from US investors: that he, his nephew, and his associates were under FBI investigation. This would imply that the issuers of the financial instruments failed to disclose “price-sensitive” information. This is an offence in India as well under SEBI’s (Listing Obligations & Disclosure Requirements) Regulations of 2015, which were subsequently amended in 2023. This jurisdictional structure is crucial to the case. It shows how Indian corporate conduct can become subject to investigations by foreign enforcement agencies when Indian companies depend on global capital markets.
The investigations in the US also did not find a place in the annual report of Adani Green Energy, even as the group claimed that it had “zero tolerance” for bribery and corruption and followed the “highest standards” of corporate governance.
Two senior lawyers, Mukul Rohatgi, former Attorney General of India who has represented Adani in cases in court and in tribunals, and Mahesh Jethmalani, Rajya Sabha MP affiliated to the BJP, both held press conferences on November 27, 2024, expressing their “personal views” that the allegations against Adani were “flimsy,” “baseless,” “malicious,” and “false.” That day, Adani Green Energy issued a statement to the NSE denying that it had been charged under the FCPA, even as it acknowledged that the DOJ and the SEC had charged it on three counts of conspiracy, fraud in transactions of securities and “wire fraud” or transmitting false information through electronic means within and from the US.
Adani then called off a planned new offering of bonds worth $600 million. TotalEnergies of France, which holds a 37.4 per cent stake in Adani Total Gas that supplies gas to various cities across the country, said it will not make fresh investments in the company, whose stock price has collapsed by 83 per cent from its peak in January 2023 after the first Hindenburg Research report came out. The French company also held 19.7 per cent of the shares of Adani Green Energy.
GQG Partners, based in Australia and headed by financier Rajiv Jain, which had bailed out Adani when shares of group companies collapsed after the first Hindenburg Research report was published, sought to play down the indictment and distance individuals from the corporate entity. Others pointed out that solar energy was only a small part of the Adani Group’s total business operations. Critics found these arguments disingenuous. And, incidentally, GQG has stayed away from investing in Adani Total Gas.
In India, the Telangana government headed by Revanth Reddy declined the ₹100 crore grant offered by Adani for a proposed educational institution. The Leader of the Opposition, Rahul Gandhi, called for Adani’s arrest. He wondered if Chief Ministers like Hemant Soren and Arvind Kejriwal could be arrested, why not Gautam Adani? The first week of the winter session of Parliament in 2024 was disrupted repeatedly. However, the INDIA alliance was far from united. Trinamool Congress MP Derek O’Brien argued that Parliament should not be held hostage to a single issue, meaning Adani.
Besides Gautam Adani, his nephew Sagar Adani and Jaain, four others who were indicted are, or were, associated with CDPQ (Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec), a Canadian pension fund. The fund had invested in Azure Power, whose officials allegedly conspired with Adani to bribe Indian officials. The officials are Cyril Cabanes of Australian-French origin based in Singapore, and three persons who appear to be of Indian origin: Saurabh Agarwal, Rupesh Agarwal and Deepak Malhotra. Arijit Barman reported in the Economic Times (ET) that two persons who were associated with Azure, Alan Rosling of the UK and Murali Subramanian, both of whom had earlier worked in India, were the likely whistleblowers who spilled the beans to the American agencies that probed the allegations of graft.
ET also pointed out that not a single unit (kilowatt-hour) of electricity has so far been supplied by Adani to SECI for Andhra Pradesh because the necessary transmission facilities are not yet in place. Meanwhile, relatively small quantities of power generated by Adani have been sold through power exchanges at prices 40 per cent higher than those agreed upon with the state’s discoms.
The government of India reacted to the Adani indictment issue on November 29, 2024. Randhir Jaiswal, spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs, said: “This is a legal matter involving private firms and individuals and the US Department of Justice. There are established procedures and legal avenues in such cases, which we believe would be followed. The government of India was not informed in advance of the issue. We haven’t had any conversation about this matter with the US government… Any request by a foreign government for the service of a summons/arrest warrant is part of mutual legal assistance. Such requests are examined on their merits. We have not received any request on this case from the US side. This is a matter which pertains to private entities and the Government of India, is not legally a part of it in any manner, at this point in time.”
As mentioned, why has the Indian government not acted within the country on the basis of the same set of allegations levelled in the US? Law-enforcement agencies in India could have used the evidence made public in the US to act against Adani under the provisions of laws such as the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1988, the Prevention of Money Laundering Act of 2002 or the Competition Act of 2002. This has not happened, and most observers say this is unlikely to happen so long as the Modi government is in power.
It may be recalled that more than a year after the case was first filed, the SEC was unable to serve a summons on Gautam Adani and his nephew, Sagar Adani. In a status report submitted on December 12, 2025, the agency informed Judge James R Cho of the Eastern District of New York court that it “understands” that India’s Ministry of Law and Justice (MoLJ) has “not yet effected service” on the Adani Group. This was the fifth report filed by the SEC, which read: “Because Defendants reside in India, the SEC previously initiated the process for serving them under the Hague Service Convention for Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters. That process requires assistance from India’s Ministry of Law and Justice, which has yet to serve Defendants.”
The process of serving summons on the Adani Group in the case had been going on for more than a year, with the SEC submitting four status reports earlier in 2025, on April 23, June 27, August 11, and October 13, stating that it was continuing to serve the Adani Group in the case.
“As detailed in its prior status updates, the SEC requested assistance from India’s MoLJ under Article 5(a) of the Hague Service Convention to serve the Summons and Complaint on Defendants. The SEC also sent Notices of Lawsuit and Requests for Waiver of Service of Summons, including copies of the Complaint, directly to Defendants and their counsel. The SEC has been in periodic contact with India’s MoLJ and understands that they have not yet effected service. The SEC’s efforts to serve the Defendants are ongoing, and it will keep the Court informed of its progress,” the SEC informed Judge Cho.
- SMELLING A BIGGER RAT
Fast forward to May 2026. Bloomberg News first reported that the DOJ was close to dismissing Adani’s case. According to the NYT, the possible dismissal of the criminal charges comes after Adani’s lawyer, Robert Giuffra, who also represents Trump, told DOJ officials in a presentation in April 2026 that Adani would not make the $10 billion investment publicly promised to create 15,000 jobs in the US, after Trump’s victory in the 2024 election, while the case was proceeding, an unnamed source said. The NYT report added that Giuffra spent the bulk of his 100-page presentation arguing the case was weak because it lacked proper jurisdiction and sufficient evidence, said the source, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
Giuffra made a similar argument in the parallel SEC case. Some prosecutors, however, made clear to the NYT that the promised $10 billion investment would have no bearing on the proceedings. “It’s unclear if others saw it differently,” the publication stated, adding, “The Justice Department did not immediately respond to a request for comment.” The Adani Group has called all the allegations “baseless”.
As stated, on May 15, 2026, Rahul Gandhi alleged that Prime Minister Modi had not struck a trade deal with the US but entered into one “for Adani’s release”. The interim trade deal agreed upon by India and the US in February reduced US tariffs on Indian goods to 18 per cent from 50 per cent, but faced criticism for sacrificing the interests of farmers and small enterprises that employ the bulk of the working people in the country.
“It is now clear that Modi made a one-sided deal with America so that Adani could get relief. This is the very reason why Modi cannot speak openly in front of America. Whatever Trump says, Modi does exactly that. Modi is completely compromised,” the Congress party posted on X.
The head of the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) and former Chief Minister of Delhi, Arvind Kejriwal, also questioned whether Adani was the reason that the Indian government had agreed not to purchase Russian oil after the US and Israel started their war on Iran, which has led to the conflict in West Asia and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Other opposition parties also wondered whether the Adani case was the reason the government was not providing full details of the deal struck with the US.
Rajya Sabha MP belonging to the Rashtriya Janata Dal, Manoj Kumar Jha, said: “I have heard this, and whether you call it quid pro quo or something else, it now seems clear why we were demanding clarity on the trade deal. We said it was unfair, lacked balance, and ignored India’s interests. Looking at the other side as well, the picture is now quite clear to me about what the reality behind the scenes was.”
The indictment of Adani in the US has exposed the rot in the middle of India’s renewables build-out plan, and the settlement does not erase larger public-interest issues. The macro question is not that Gautam Adani did not face trial in New York. It is how India’s green-industrial policy, foreign capital dependence and political patronage produced a transaction that became prosecutable abroad but has so far not been investigated in India. This country wants to finance a vast energy transition. To achieve this, India’s largest renewable energy companies require access to global bond markets, development finance, foreign equity capital and the confidence of investors. The US case alleged that this green-capital story rested, in part, on state-level power contracts obtained through corrupt inducements and investor disclosures that concealed material risk.
India’s energy transition is a public-private bargain. The government sets renewable energy targets and agencies such as SECI tender large projects. Private companies bid to generate power, state discoms sign purchase agreements, and global investors fund the expansion through bonds, loans and equity. The model depends on three forms of credibility: the credibility of state demand, the credibility of private compliance, and the credibility of disclosures made to capital markets.
The Adani case sits at the intersection of all three. SECI awarded large solar projects. State governments were needed as buyers to purchase the power. According to the US indictment and SEC complaint, the tariff was unattractive to some state distribution companies, creating the alleged need to induce officials to sign or approve purchase commitments. Meanwhile, Adani Green and related entities raised funds from investors, including US investors, while allegedly representing that they followed robust anti-bribery and compliance practices.
If the allegations are true, the case is not merely about bribes. It is about the financing architecture of India’s renewable transition. Green energy was presented to investors as clean capital. The US agencies alleged that the underlying contract pipeline depended on corrupt state procurement. That is why the case matters even if the US legal process ends in settlement. Global investors will not forget the underlying allegations.
The settlement may reduce Adani’s immediate legal exposure in the United States. It does not answer the governance question raised earlier by Sarma and others. Why have the same factual allegations not produced a comparable public investigation by Indian agencies into SECI, state electricity distribution companies, state officials, power-purchase agreements and securities disclosures?
The indictment and SEC complaint should be read as disclosure cases as much as bribery cases. US authorities did not need to prove that every rupee of an alleged bribe was actually paid in India to identify a securities-law problem. Their theory was that Adani Green and related entities raised capital while making statements about anti-corruption compliance, governance and legal risks. Those statements would have been materially misleading if senior executives were involved in, or aware of, a bribery scheme and an ongoing US investigation.
This distinction matters because the Adani Group later emphasised that Gautam Adani and Sagar Adani had not been charged under every possible count, including certain FCPA counts. That may be legally relevant, but it does not dispose of the investor-disclosure issue. Under US securities law, a company that raises money from American investors while concealing conduct that could affect its contracts, finances or reputation may face liability even if the public officials involved are in another country.
For Indian readers, the equivalent question lies under SEBI’s Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements Regulations, the Companies Act and general securities-fraud principles. Did Adani Green disclose material investigations and corruption risk to Indian exchanges and investors in time? Did its annual reports and bond documents fairly describe the risk? Those questions have not been publicly tested with the same intensity in India.
The allegations arose against the backdrop of difficulties in converting centrally awarded renewable energy projects into state-level power purchases. While SECI can conduct tenders and sign power-sale agreements, the electricity must ultimately be bought by state distribution companies or other state-backed buyers. If the tariff is considered too high relative to market alternatives, states may resist. That creates a gap between project award and revenue certainty.
According to the US allegations, the bribery scheme addressed that gap. Officials in Indian states were allegedly induced to cause state distribution companies to enter into power-purchase or power-sale arrangements. The alleged bribe amounts were reportedly linked to megawatts of contracted power. If accurate, this would mean the corrupt payment was not incidental to the project. It was part of the mechanism by which demand was created for the power.
That is why the case belongs inside India’s green-industrial political economy. Renewable-energy capacity is not valuable merely because it is installed. It is valuable when it has buyers, tariffs, transmission, payment security and financeable contracts. The alleged corruption concerned the middle layer: the conversion of capacity awards into bankable offtake.
This is the vulnerability of India’s green-capital model. Indian renewable expansion is too large to be financed only domestically. Companies must borrow abroad. Once they do, governance failures at home can become securities cases abroad.
- INDIA’S TELLING SILENCE
The Government of India initially described the matter as a legal issue involving private firms and the US Department of Justice. The Ministry of External Affairs stated on November 29, 2024, that India had not been informed in advance and that any request for service of summons or arrest warrants would be examined through established legal procedures. It also said the Government of India was not legally a part of the matter at that stage.
That answer addressed the diplomatic process but ignored domestic accountability. The allegations concerned Indian public officials, Indian public-sector or state-linked power contracts, and Indian listed-company disclosures. Indian agencies could have examined the same public materials under the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, the Companies Act, and SEBI’s Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements Regulations.
The asymmetry is striking. US agencies treated the alleged bribery as an investor-protection and market-integrity issue. Indian agencies have not treated it publicly as a corruption, procurement, electricity-tariff, disclosure or public-finance issue.
The SEC’s difficulty in serving Gautam Adani and Sagar Adani in India became a separate institutional issue. Status reports filed in the US case said the SEC had initiated service under the Hague Service Convention through India’s Ministry of Law and Justice and had not yet obtained completed service for many months. The procedural point is technical, but the political signal is not. When Indian authorities are slow or unable to facilitate service in a foreign civil securities case involving Indian nationals, it reinforces the impression that powerful domestic actors are insulated by state inaction.
The Government of India may argue that mutual legal assistance and Hague service requests must follow a formal procedure and cannot be rushed. That is true. But the public record should then show timely processing, clear reasons for delay, and consistent treatment across defendants. In a case involving a politically connected business group, silence itself becomes part of the controversy.
Reports about the May 2026 settlement in the US that referred to Adani’s publicly announced willingness to invest $10 billion in the United States and create 15,000 jobs also stated that American prosecutors had said that the investment proposal would not determine the case’s resolution. The reporting nevertheless raised a serious question: whether US enforcement in a second Trump administration had become more transactional in cases involving foreign billionaires, jobs and investment promises.
The SEC penalties have to be assessed against the scale of the alleged scheme. The original US allegations described hundreds of millions of dollars in bribes or promised bribes and contracts projected to generate large long-term profits. Civil penalties of $18 million against two individuals, without admission or denial, would be modest relative to the alleged economic stakes. That does not make the settlement unlawful. It does raise the question of whether enforcement has become a pricing mechanism rather than an accountability mechanism.
As for the opposition’s claims that the Adani settlement had cast its shadow on the US-India trade deal, the allegations expose a structural problem created by Adani’s closeness to the Indian state. When a private conglomerate becomes identified with the Prime Minister’s economic model, its legal problems abroad can contaminate trade diplomacy. India has made concessions on agricultural imports according to the latest reporting on negotiations for an India-US trade deal.
The indictment also mattered because it struck at India’s attempt to present itself as a reliable destination for global capital. After the Hindenburg Research report in January 2023, Adani stocks recovered partly because major investors, including GQG Partners, provided capital and confidence. The November 2024 US indictment reopened the question of whether the group’s governance risk was idiosyncratic or systemic.
International commentary after the indictment warned that the case could affect Indian companies’ ability to raise money abroad, especially in sectors dependent on state contracts. That concern is not merely reputational. Global investors price political and governance risk into bonds, loans and equity. If India appears unwilling to investigate corruption allegations involving its own public contracts, investors may demand higher returns or narrower covenants from other Indian issuers. The cost is then borne by the wider economy, not only by Adani.
The renewable energy sector is particularly exposed because it depends on long-dated contracts with state buyers. Investors must believe that tariffs are lawful, payments are reliable, and contract awards are clean. If the bankability of renewable projects depends on political access, the energy transition becomes more expensive.
- GREEN RISE, CRONY FOUNDATIONS
The Adani settlement in the US is not only a legal story. It is a story about India’s development model. The state wants rapid renewable-energy expansion. It relies on large private champions to deliver capacity. Those champions raise foreign capital on the promise of clean energy, governance and scale. If the underlying state contracts are allegedly secured through political inducement, the green transition becomes vulnerable to the same cronyism that marked older infrastructure sectors.
The May 2026 settlement posture may reduce the immediate risk to Gautam Adani in the United States. It increases the burden on Indian institutions. If US agencies can extract penalties or negotiate outcomes while India does not publicly investigate its own officials, contracts and disclosures, the result is a failure of sovereignty. India supplies the projects, tariffs, officials and consumers. Foreign regulators supply accountability. As legal experts observe, such an outcome highlights a trend towards the “financialisation” of criminal justice in high-profile cases. The implications of this resolution could reshape perceptions of accountability in corporate governance.
That is the macro point. Adani’s renewable energy empire was meant to symbolise India’s green rise. The US case showed how dependent that rise is on foreign capital and how weak domestic enforcement can turn Indian public contracts into foreign securities cases. The question for India is not whether Adani escapes one proceeding. It is whether the state can govern the private champions it has chosen to build its future.
In a best-case (but most unlikely) scenario, a complete Indian investigation should obtain the SECI tender documents; power-sale agreements with state distribution companies; Andhra Pradesh cabinet and energy-department files; correspondence between SECI, state buyers and Adani Green; minutes or records of meetings involving Gautam Adani, Sagar Adani and state officials; Adani Green bond-offering documents; annual-report risk disclosures; Indian exchange filings after March 2023; mutual legal assistance and Hague service correspondence; and any official settlement documents of the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, if the reported sanctions matter is pursued.
The Indian question remains the most important one. The United States can settle its securities case. It cannot determine whether Indian public contracts were clean, whether Indian officials acted lawfully, or whether Indian investors received timely disclosure. That responsibility lies with Indian institutions. If India’s law enforcement agencies will not take up the task, civil society, media, and opposition parties have to.
The indictment of Gautam Adani, his nephew and their associates in the United States of America has dealt a blow to the reputation of one of India’s, and one of the world’s, richest men, whose proximity to Prime Minister Modi is well known. Thus, Modi cannot hope to completely insulate himself from the fallout of the allegations against Adani.
EXPLAINER:
What is a plea bargain?
A pre-trial negotiation in criminal law where a defendant agrees to plead guilty, or “no contest”, in exchange for concessions from the prosecutor, such as reduced charges, dropped counts, or a lighter sentence recommendation.
What does a defendant gain?
Primarily, a reduced sentence, often well below what a trial conviction could attract, along with the certainty of a known outcome, avoiding the expense and stress of a prolonged trial.
What makes a plea bargain valid in the US?
The US Supreme Court requires that the guilty plea be entered voluntarily by both sides, free from coercion, ensuring defendants are not pressured into accepting deals against their will.
How does it work in India?
Plea bargaining in India is governed under Chapter XXIA of the Criminal Procedure Code, now renamed the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS). Unlike the US, its application is tightly restricted.
Which cases qualify in India?
Only offences not punishable by death, life imprisonment, or prison terms exceeding seven years. It explicitly excludes socio-economic offences and crimes against women or children.
Is this restriction unique to India?
No. Several countries similarly bar plea bargaining for heinous or severe crimes, prioritising full accountability over negotiated settlements in the most serious cases.
GFX 1
CORRUPTION CHAIN (From SECI Tender to US Securities Law)
| Stage | Institution / Actor | Public-Interest Issue |
| Renewable tender | Solar Energy Corporation of India (SECI) | Central agency awarded large renewable-energy capacity to private generators. |
| Power sale | State electricity distribution companies and state governments | States had to agree to buy power; US agencies alleged inducements were used to secure commitments. |
| Capital raising | Adani Green Energy and related entities | Investors were allegedly told that compliance systems were robust and that bribery was not occurring. |
| US jurisdiction | US investors, bond markets and financial institutions | US securities law applied because US investors were allegedly affected by misstatements or omissions. |
| Indian enforcement gap | CBI, ED, Income Tax Department, SEBI, Central Vigilance Commission and state government agencies | Public record has not shown a comparable Indian investigation into the same alleged facts. |
GFX 2
SECI (Central Government)
↓ [Awarded solar contracts]
Adani Green Energy / Azure Power
↓ [Needed state buyers for power]
State Discoms — Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu,
Odisha, Chhattisgarh, J&K
↓ [Tariff too high; states reluctant]
Alleged cash bribes to state officials
[₹25 lakh per MW | Total alleged: $265 million]
↓ [States sign power purchase agreements]
Adani raises $750m + $409m in US bond markets
↓ [Concealed FBI investigation from investors]
US Securities Law triggered
↓
DOJ indictment + SEC complaint
GFX 3: FOLLOW THE MONEY
| Figure | Amount |
| Alleged bribes paid/promised | $265 million (₹2,029 cr) |
| Alleged bribes to AP alone | $228 million (₹1,746 cr) |
| US bonds raised (2021) | $750 million |
| US bonds raised (2024) | $409 million |
| Bonds cancelled post-indictment | $600 million |
| OFAC sanctions settlement | $275 million |
| Gautam Adani penalty | $6 million |
| Sagar Adani penalty Adani’s US investment pledge | $12 million $ 10 million |
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GFX 4 FROM INDICTMENT TO SETTLEMENT (18 Months of Legal Jeopardy)
Jan 2023: Hindenburg Research report; Adani stocks crash
Mar 17, 2023: FBI confronts Sagar Adani; seizes devices
Nov 21, 2024: DOJ indictment unsealed; SEC complaint filed; stocks fall 7–22%
Nov 27, 2024: Rohatgi and Jethmalani hold press conferences
Nov 29, 2024: MEA issues statement; GoI distances itself
Dec 2024: Adani cancels $600 million bond offering
Apr-Oct 2025: SEC files four status reports on failed summons service
Dec 12, 2025: Fifth SEC status report; India’s MoLJ still has not served summons
Feb 2026: India-US interim trade deal struck Apr 2026: Giuffra presents 100-page case to DOJ
May 14, 2026: Settlement announced; Gautam pays $6m, Sagar pays $12m, Group pays $275m
May 15, 2026: Rahul Gandhi’s “bargain for Adani’s release” statement
