During the era of Non-Alignment, the world was divided by superpowers and competing political-economic ideologies. But is global division in the 21st century shifting towards religious and civilisational identity? Could the coming order be shaped by military and economic alliances as well as religious identity, collective security, resources and strategic partnerships?
The strategic initiative between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan in Mecca in August 7, 2026 may indicate this changing global picture. The “White Man’s Burden” raises another question about great powers organising the world on their own terms.
Can India once again play the role of an independent strategic pole outside any bloc, or will circumstances require it to become a separate centre of power? The Iran-America war, in this reading, is a sign of a world in which old friendships may not remain permanent.
Wars are never fought only with guns. Sometimes they alter the way the world is imagined. The Iran-America conflict is formally between two countries, but behind it lie oil, the nuclear programme, religious identity, regional security, maritime trade and the question of whether countries should remain tied to a superpower or build separate strategic space. This is where the idea of a three-polar world emerges.
One possible future could see a Western, Christian-historical order alongside a strategic arrangement among Muslim nations shaped by religious identity. “Christian State” and “Islamic State” are civilisational metaphors, not references to specific states or ISIS.
A third group could comprise countries unwilling to tie their strategic destiny to America, Iran or another religious-regional power. Their partnerships could be based on history, culture, technology, energy, security and civilisational interests.
India, Italy, France, Germany, Israel and some African nations could become potential partners. But this would not be a fixed bloc; international equations and strategic requirements can change.
The third pole is therefore less a fixed list than a transformation: before asking, “Whom should we be with?”, nations may ask, “What kind of world do we want?”
The hypothesis is also informed by Donald Trump’s speeches on July 3 and July 4, 2026 and the possibility of Islamic strategic solidarity reflected in the Mecca agreement. Trump’s speeches stressed sovereignty, freedom and “America First”; official US administration documents describe the policy as prioritising American interests, sovereignty and independence.
At Mount Rushmore on July 3, Trump contrasted being a “communist” with being a “patriot” and criticised Marxist interpretations of American history. At the 250th Independence anniversary, sovereignty, freedom and “America First” were central to his outlook.
This does not establish a formal bipolar order, but indicates how national interest, political ideology and civilisational identity could become foundations for new groupings.
On August 7, 2026, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement. It states that an armed attack on any one of the three will be considered an attack on all three, while strengthening collective resistance and defence cooperation. The agreement also identifies “Islamic solidarity” and shared strategic interests as a basis for cooperation. Pakistan has described it as a second NATO.
Political unity among Muslim nations is not new. Pan-Islamism emerged prominently in the late 19th century, particularly during the era of Abdulhamid II, seeking to turn religious solidarity into political strength amid Western pressure. During the Cold War, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran used it differently. The 1969 Rabat Islamic Conference, following the arson attack at the Al-Aqsa Mosque, helped lay the groundwork for the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.
The significance of the 2026 Mecca agreement lies in its collective-security provision. An attack on one member is to be considered an attack on all three. The first strategic committee meeting in Istanbul on August 31 agreed to establish a permanent secretariat and expand defence-industry and technology cooperation. The arrangement has been compared with NATO’s Article 5, although assistance would be determined through consultation.
The three countries possess different assets: Pakistan has nuclear deterrence capability; Saudi Arabia combines the religious centrality of Mecca and Medina with energy and economic power; Turkiye has substantial military and industrial capability. Iran remains an important Muslim power whose Shia model has long competed with Saudi Arabia.
Rudyard Kipling’s 1899 poem The White Man’s Burden was written amid America’s acquisition of the Philippines and debates over expansionism and imperialism. Its underlying idea was that a Western power could regard itself as responsible for bringing governance, order and civilisation to other societies. Later, the concept was criticised for its association with colonial expansion and racial hierarchy.
The question is whether a superpower exercising pressure over sovereign countries can again raise the question of who has the right to determine other nations’ futures in their own interests.
Venezuela, Greenland and Iceland illustrate this debate. In August-September 2026, the US government described an agreement linked to Venezuela’s proven oil reserves of more than 65 billion barrels as a major achievement of American energy dominance, involving rights concerning economic ownership and governance. This was not formal territorial occupation, but represented expanded American influence.
The Greenland episode raised questions about American control and acquisition; a September agreement preserved Danish sovereignty while providing America permanent security and military access. On 8 September, Trump shared a map showing Iceland under the American flag, prompting Iceland to summon the US ambassador and call it “completely inappropriate”.
Calling any country an “American colony” would be a political-philosophical interpretation, not a legal status. Yet these developments raise a broader question: can a superpower define the limits of other countries’ sovereignty, resources and economic independence?
Multiple centres of power are not new. During the Cold War, the Western bloc was led by America, the socialist bloc by the Soviet Union, while countries across Asia, Africa and Latin America pursued the Non-Aligned Movement. India and newly independent African countries developed it as an independent foreign-policy option, free from colonial legacies and superpower competition. Its foundation was independence.
The three-polar world could be fundamentally different. Military and economic power may remain important, but civilisational and religious identity could increasingly shape alignments: a Western-American structure; collective security among Muslim countries; and a third group seeking a distinct civilisational-strategic identity.
This would not be Non-Alignment in the old sense. It meant remaining independent without joining a bloc. The new hypothesis asks whether the world itself could become organised into religious and civilisational poles.
That is the central question for India. Its history, geography, economic interests, strategic partnerships and civilisational connections give it relationships across competing regions. If the world is moving towards identity-driven strategic poles, India will have to decide whether to balance among them or help shape an independent third centre of power.
The danger is a new polarisation in which religion, civilisation, security, resources and economic pressure reinforce one another. The world once divided itself around superpowers; it may now divide around identities.
For India, the challenge is larger than choosing friends: it is to determine what kind of world it wants to help build.
