India’s neighbourhood has once again begun to feel the tremors of regime change and internal conflict. Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan have all witnessed political churning and social upheavals. India cannot remain isolated from such developments, since the spillover of political turbulence inevitably affects its geopolitical and geoeconomic interests.
In Bangladesh and Nepal alike, elected governments were unseated through movements driven by students and young protesters. These developments have strained bilateral ties and posed significant challenges to India’s “Neighbourhood First” policy. Though such periodic upheavals often have domestic origins, they also provide opportunities for insidious external intervention aimed at furthering the goals of hegemonic geopolitics pursued by major powers.
Today, the tools of intervention have evolved. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are increasingly used as instruments of covert activity, while social media platforms serve as narcotics-like vehicles for viral narratives and psychological influence. In a deeply interconnected digital world, narrative-building through social media has become the preferred mode of conducting influence operations.
Regime change operations are now executed via well-funded NGOs supporting political activists and managing influence campaigns. American entities such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) are well known for these activities. Their modus operandi involves identifying promising young leaders and financing their travel to “conferences” where subtle political cues and strategies are delivered.
These NGOs also organise “capacity-building” initiatives. That both NDI and IRI have historically cooperated with the CIA to organise regime change operations under the camouflage of promoting democracy and human rights is the worst-kept secret in international politics. When such interventions succeed, leaked documents invariably confirm these patterns, sending a clear message to others: fall in line, or you are next. Ironically, even the US Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard has publicly admitted that America’s policy of “regime change” and “nation building” is now “over”, an implicit acknowledgement that such practices were once standard operating procedure.
Here, Bangladesh is a classic case in point of this geopolitical nexus of regime change. Former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s troubles with Washington began when she refused an American proposal to hand over St. Martin’s Island, off the Arakan coast of Myanmar, for use as a military base. The island’s proximity to Coco Island, where China is believed to have built surveillance facilities, made it strategically vital. Hasina later revealed that a senior US official had privately assured her she would not be “disturbed” if she complied, an offer she declined. Hasina’s ouster sent a clear signal to other regional governments, including New Delhi.
The present interim government chief, Muhammad Yunus and his administration, comprising technocrats and dual nationals, have shown unmistakable alignment with its regime-change patrons. It is effectively collaborating with US-sponsored NGOs to shape reforms and influence upcoming elections, said to be held in February. Both NDI and IRI are scheduled to send observers to the proposed polls under the pretext of ensuring fairness and transparency.
A former American ambassador who oversaw the students’ agitation in Dhaka returned as an adviser to Excelerate Energy, which has since been awarded a US$8.5 billion LNG contract, cancelling an earlier deal with a Mumbai-based firm. This highlights the commercial dimension of political engineering, with the US securing lucrative energy and trade deals while exerting tariff pressure.
Following Bangladesh’s trade surplus with the US, Washington imposed a 35 per cent tariff on Bangladeshi exports in 2024, later reduced to 20 per cent. Further cuts are now linked to reciprocal trade incentives and contracts favourable to American firms.
As per the prescriptions, Yunus has embraced the Jamaat-e-Islami, Pakistan’s fifth column since the 1971 Liberation War, when it collaborated in genocidal violence against Bangladeshi civilians. Jamaat has long enjoyed close links with the United States, which historically viewed it as a useful instrument for political influence in Bangladesh.
By contrast, Hasina firmly contained Islamist forces, executed Jamaat leaders convicted of 1971 war crimes, eliminated anti-India insurgents, and deepened counter-terrorism cooperation. Trade ties with India also touched a new high of US$18 billion annually, making Bangladesh India’s largest South Asian trading partner.
The Yunus regime’s attitude towards India has been marked by hostility, shaped by its alliance with Islamist forces and pathological animosity towards Hasina. Dhaka’s rhetoric has included absurd claims about “controlling” India’s North-eastern states, with some officials even suggesting seizing them “by force”. The revival of military ties with Pakistan and joint defence outreach with China have reinforced perceptions of Dhaka drifting into an anti-India axis. Pakistan’s Army Chief, “Mullah Munir”, has even threatened India with retribution from the “East”. Yet, some hedging persists. An Indian Military Intelligence team recently visited Lalmonirhat Airport near the Siliguri Corridor and Chittagong, both eyed by China. The Bangladesh Army, though divided ideologically, still retains goodwill towards India.
The turmoil in South Asia is far from over. In fact, the region is at an inflection point. From Afghanistan’s instability to Nepal’s political fragility and Bangladesh’s internal reorientation, the region’s volatility poses both challenges and opportunities for New Delhi. India’s strategic dilemma will persist, complicated by great-power rivalries and geopolitical ambitions that continue to intrude into the region.
New Delhi’s response will determine whether it remains a passive observer or an active shaper of the regional order. The foundation for this approach lies in India’s “Neighbourhood First” policy, anchored in the conviction that a peaceful, democratic, politically stable and economically integrated neighbourhood best serves India’s long-term national interests. Yet, the overhang of history, geography and asymmetry complicates India’s relations with its neighbours, often breeding mistrust.
India’s central dilemma in South Asia is how to promote a stable neighbourhood when political volatility diverts attention from its core goals of fostering regional prosperity amid challenges of terrorism, religious radicalism, illegal migration, historical grievances and environmental stress.
Accordingly, India has extended non-reciprocal concessions to neighbours, barring Pakistan, the perennial outlier, while maintaining open borders with Bhutan and Nepal, offering duty-free access for their goods, and deploying soft power through education, healthcare, training and cultural exchange. Its role as the first responder in natural disasters further strengthens goodwill.
Bangladesh’s trajectory remains pivotal. Its geographic proximity, trade interdependence and shared security architecture make it central to India’s eastern frontier. Any erosion of Indian influence in Dhaka could embolden Islamist, Chinese or Pakistani forces to constrict India’s strategic space in the Bay of Bengal.
If elections proceed as planned, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party may prevail. India expects free, fair and inclusive polls; any exercise excluding the Awami League would fall short. Post-election, New Delhi must recalibrate its policy to safeguard its strategic and economic interests.
(Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty served as secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs. He was also high commissioner to Bangladesh and ambassador to Thailand)
