In the latest act of violation of international law, the USA President Donald Trump’s military intervention in Venezuela, including the kidnapping of President Nicolas Maduro and his wife, is the most egregious example. The Maduros will be arraigned in a USA law court on charges of drug smuggling. The USA has done it before in Panama when it kidnapped and imprisoned former dictator Manuel Noriega in 1989.
On the false pretext of possession of nuclear weapons, the USA invaded Iraq and ousted President Saddam Hussein. The former president of Honduras was imprisoned in the USA for drug smuggling. Thereafter, another invasion ousted Libya’s President Muammar Gaddafi. These regime change operations left in their wake countries in shambles.
The USA has launched military interventions in other countries throughout its history, conducting about 400 interventions between 1776 and 2026. As a global hegemon, the USA has felt the need to display “shock and awe”. Other pretexts have been “human rights” and “promotion of democracy”.
President Trump has declared that he will “run” Venezuela till a “proper transition” takes place. At the UNSC emergency session, the USA claimed the intervention was only to arrest a felon wanted for sending drugs to the USA. It has sought to justify its action at the UNSC to dodge the stigma of violating international laws on sovereignty.
For Trump, it is about reasserting hegemony, grabbing resources and pushing back China’s inroads into Latin America. Trump has again signalled that he is fixated on grabbing Venezuela’s oil and scrambling to access rare earth minerals. Oil and the dollar are closely linked. Behind the regime change operation is the lurking fear of de-dollarisation that will sink the American economy, running a national debt of US$39 trillion. Clearly, printing more dollars is like putting a band-aid on a cancerous ulcer. There is a pattern of American interventions in Latin American countries, reminding the world about the “Monroe Doctrine”.
Earlier, his unilateral tariff war battered international trading rules and undermined the multilateral framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The so-called “rules-based international order”, touted frequently by the West, is headed for the garbage bin of history. American interventions to disrupt the international system pose challenges for all countries because of the USA’s heft as the world’s largest economy, with the largest military and technological lead.
While expressing concern, India’s official reaction to the American misadventure in Venezuela has been low-key. The impact on oil prices in the international market has been marginal so far. Venezuela has the largest proven reserves of oil, and when it flows into the market, prices will go down. It will benefit India. But Trump has again threatened India with higher tariffs if India continues to buy Russian oil. Trump basically wants India to buy more American-produced oil, since its oil companies will have access to more oil from Venezuela.
At this juncture, India too faces policy choices that will determine its future trajectory, as it seeks economic growth and security, at a time of disruptive global trends. India has had to adapt and rely more on self-reliance, a new architecture of supply chains and more robust military capabilities. The changed dynamics in India–USA relations are a classic example of this change, wherein established certainties are no longer valid. India will have to upgrade and expand ties with other friendly partners across the globe.
India’s foreign policy challenges must, therefore, shift towards a more judicious mix of the traditional and transactional approaches with the USA and seek other partners in trade via FTAs, to compensate for the loss of market share in the USA. Shifts in foreign policy are not to be construed as failures since “Black Swan” events do happen. Strategic reset follows. This adaptation is also necessary for retaining India’s strategic autonomy. Hence, the booting capabilities of Indian exporters are a collateral aspect of this reset. Another essential aspect of the reset is the urgent requirement for upgrading military technologies and domestic capabilities that are necessary for influencing and navigating an increasingly fractured global order. In the world of AI and cyberwarfare and social media narratives, a reset in India’s organisational structures to deal with these challenges is long overdue.
Is the world heading for a changed international order? If the theory that the world changes every 100 years applies, since the current international order was built after 1945, when the Second World War ended, are we approaching 2045? Do we need several poles for a stable and changed international order? The “rules-based international order” is increasingly viewed as a narrative for perpetuating Western hegemony. The power matrix of this hierarchy has changed with the rise of China, other emerging economies and greater salience of the Global South. The shifts in the power matrix require a revised international order.
As India faces these complex issues in the changing international order, marked by polycrisis, there are no ready-made prescriptions. India’s foreign policy, built on strategic autonomy, has relied on global engagement through dialogue, as well as issue-based cooperation and partnerships. This emerges from India’s civilisational experience and domestic diversity. As the fastest growing economy, India has overtaken Japan in terms of GDP to become the fourth largest economy in the world. India’s primary goal remains domestic transformation, which guides its external engagement and partnerships. In a fragmented international order, India has exercised various options that include strategic hedging to dissipate risk.
India’s foremost foreign policy challenges are in its neighbourhood, including the maritime domain of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). India’s response to the regime changes in Bangladesh and Nepal has been marked by strategic patience and maturity. Pakistan’s continuing reliance on terrorism has received a robust response. India’s response to the economic crises in Sri Lanka and the Maldives has boosted the reliability factor and India’s objective of being the first responder in a crisis. The signs of a careful blend of deterrence and cooperative economic and security engagement show an evolving neighbourhood policy, which is premised on shared economic progress and stability.
The relationship with China, an economic and military power, is a challenge that intersects problems of an unresolved boundary dispute, economic disparity and contestation in the Indo-Pacific region. Without shunning dialogue, India has reinforced its position to meet this challenge, which is not merely bilateral but extends to China’s influence in other countries in the neighbourhood and the IOR. Hence, India’s posture in the maritime domain has changed from the initial SAGAR doctrine to the revised MAHASAGAR vision that emphasises growth and security. In the Indo-Pacific, the engagement continues at a lower key as Trump’s focus has turned inward.
India has also expanded its engagement with plurilateral organisations like BRICS, SCO and ASEAN. India has significantly expanded its outreach to the Global South, prioritising development, capacity building, food and energy security, and access to new technologies. The challenges to India’s foreign policy are multifarious, and India’s role in shaping the changes in the international order will grow, its strategic autonomy enabling promotion of its national interest and the global good, as India navigates an increasingly fractured international order.
(The author served as secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs. He is also a former Indian high commissioner to Bangladesh and ambassador to Thailand)
